In this article, we review the literature on the measurement of trade costs in international trade with a special emphasis on nontari¤ measures and in particular on standards and technical regulations. We distinguish 'direct' from 'indirect' approaches. The direct approach collects observable data or proxy variables on trade cost components which are then typically used as regressors in a gravity equation of trade. Instead, the indirect approach infers the extent of trade impediments from trade ‡ows. It compares actual trade ‡ows to the trade ‡ows predicted by a hypothetical frictionless benchmark scenario based on a micro-founded trade model, attributing the deviation of actual from predicted trade ‡ows to trade frictions. We argue that economists and policymakers can gain useful insights from both approaches.
Introduction
Despite the long tradition in the international economics profession of investigating the sources and size of trade costs, empirical researchers continue to face a major challenge in measuring trade costs since 'direct measures are remarkably sparse and inaccurate' (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p. 692) . Direct measures are available for a few components such as transportation and insurance costs, policy barriers such as tari¤ or nontari¤ measures, but not for many other components such as bureaucratic red tape. In addition, data coverage is often limited to a few countries, industries, products or years (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) .
To overcome those di¢culties, an alternative approach to measuring trade costs is to indirectly infer the level of trade impediments from trade ‡ows. A …rst way of doing this is to use the 'phi-ness' of trade to estimate 'border e¤ects,' which is in essence a ratio of bilateral over domestic trade ‡ows and mostly re ‡ects border-related costs (Head and Ries, 2001 , Baldwin et al., 2003 , Head and Mayer, 2004 . A second and related approach is to rely on a measure of bilateral trade impediments that is derived by modeling disaggregated trade ‡ows at the industry level in the gravity framework pioneered by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) , allowing trade costs to be heterogeneous across industries. The resulting measure accounts for heterogeneity across industries by incorporating industry-speci…c substitution elasticities (Chen and Novy, 2011) . This paper reviews the literature on the measurement of trade costs with a special emphasis on nontari¤ measures such as product standards and technical regulations which require speci…c product characteristics or production methods in order to guarantee the health and safety of consumers or the protection of the environment. 1 Di¤ering standards and technical regulations (or Technical Barriers to Trade, TBTs) can indeed be obstacles to trade as they can create additional costs for foreign producers by forcing them to adjust their products to meet national requirements. In order to overcome their trade-distorting e¤ects, policymakers try to harmonize such standards and regulations between countries. 2 A contrasting view considers that standards and regulations may instead encourage trade by raising quality or by promoting scale economies (see Blind, 2004 , Swann et al., 1996 . Our main aim, however, is to review how standards and regulations are measured for the purpose of empirical analysis, not how they a¤ect international trade (Swann, 2010) .
Compared to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , who provide an extensive review of the measurement of any type of trade costs, the objective of this paper is to extend their review to articles mostly published after their seminal contribution with a special emphasis on standards and technical regulations. We also distinguish between the 'direct' and the 'indirect' approaches to measuring non-1 Technical regulations are imposed by governments so that their compliance is mandatory, while for standards compliance is only voluntary : …rms decide to comply with standards, otherwise their products may simply not be demanded by …rms or consumers (Baller, 2007) . 2 In the EU policymakers rely on mutual recognition or on technical harmonization. With mutual recognition, each country is obliged to accept on its territory the products lawfully marketed in another member state even if foreign products are manufactured according to technical rules that di¤er from domestic ones (Brenton et al., 2001 ). When this is not possible, mutual recognition is replaced by technical harmonization (since 1985 the 'New Approach' to technical harmonization has only de…ned the essential safety requirements of a product, leaving the producer free to design the rest). Both mutual recognition and harmonization are thus expected to promote trade within the harmonizing region (Baller, 2007 , Brenton et al., 2001 , Chen and Mattoo, 2008 . tari¤ measures and illustrate their similarities and di¤erences using some data on private standards at the European Union (EU) level.
The Gravity Equation as a Starting Point
Traditionally, researchers attempt to learn about the e¤ect of trade costs on trade by considering the gravity equation, which has been shown to have broad theoretical foundations (Anderson, 2011) . As an illustration, we adopt the popular speci…cation by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) based on an Armington model:
where bilateral trade ‡ows    in industry  depend on output    of the exporting country  in industry  and expenditure    of the importing country  relative to global output   in that industry. The interest focuses on bilateral trade costs    . They reduce trade as governed by the elasticity of substitution    1 amongst the underlying product varieties in that industry. All else being equal, larger average outward trade barriers ¦   of country  and larger average inward trade barriers    of country  lead to more bilateral trade. 3 For estimation purposes, gravity equation (1) is typically loglinearized, and the output and multilateral resistance terms are absorbed by exporter and importer …xed e¤ects, or they are approximated using Baier and Bergstrand's (2009) 
method.
A researcher who wants to estimate the e¤ect of trade costs on trade needs to specify a trade cost function by relating the unobservable    variable to observable trade cost proxies. Such proxies typically include geographic data such as distance between countries  and  as well as a range of cultural, historical or political variables. This might also include some measures for standards and technical regulations as we explain in the next section.
The 'Direct' Approach
The direct approach to measuring trade costs collects observable data or proxy variables on trade cost components. The literature we review is grouped under two headings according to the way standards and technical regulations are measured: explicit measures assess the existence or the amount of standards and regulations, while implicit measures typically capture the trade e¤ects of standards and regulations without establishing how many are present.
Explicit Measures
Count of the Number of Standards Perinorm is a subscription-only bibliographic database on national, European and international standards for the industries of 23 countries. The papers that use this rich database to measure standards typically count the total number of standards per industry and country, and distinguish 'national' standards from 'harmonized' standards (de…ned as being equivalent either to international standards, e.g., Swann et al., 1996, or partners, e.g., Moenius, 2004 Moenius, , 2006 Moenius, , 2007 . 45 Unfortunately, such count measures su¤er from a 'mixed bag' problem (Swann, 2010, p. 10) as they just add up standards that might di¤er in importance 6 but also in type (e.g., quality versus compatibility standards). In an attempt to measure the relative stringency and technical complexity of di¤erent standards, the number of pages of each standard is sometimes used as a proxy for its complexity (Shepherd, 2006 , Czubala et al., 2009 Noti…cation Data from the WTO The UNCTAD's TRAINS database records noti…cations on regulations to the WTO from the late 1980s and provides information on the notifying country (the importer), the a¤ected product and the type of barrier. WTO rules require members to notify the WTO whenever a proposed or adopted regulation 1) is not in accordance with an international one, and 2) may a¤ect the trade of other members. The use of such information to measure regulations therefore su¤ers from three main shortcomings. First, if one country applies an internationally recognized regulation while other countries do not, then this cross-country di¤erence is not accounted for in the data set. Second, only changes to existing measures have to be reported, which means that measures that have existed for a long time but have never been changed are not accounted for either. Third, there is suspicion that some countries systematically notify more frequently than others, raising concerns about data consistency across countries.
Noti…cations are generally used to compute coverage and frequency ratios to explain trade ‡ows (e.g., Disdier et al., 2008 , Essaji, 2008 . 8 Even if they are widely used in empirical analysis, it is worth remembering that both su¤er from weaknesses: neither is able to capture precisely the relative importance of each nontari¤ measure in a¤ecting trade ‡ows because the frequency ratio simply adds up the measures as if they were all the same, while the coverage ratio erroneously gives a small weight to the products covered by the most trade-restrictive policies (Nogués et al., 1986 , Korinek et al., 2006 .
Identi…cation of Standards and Regulations
Based on a literature review, case studies and interviews with national bodies in the 15 EU member states and with EU o¢cials, a study undertaken for the European Commission (European Commission, 1998) assesses the types of measures applying in 130 industries within the EU: technical regulations, standards, both or no barriers. It also assesses, on a …ve-point scale, the overall e¤ectiveness of EU policies in removing TBTs where the largest value indicates that all TBTs were successfully removed (Chen, 2004, Chen and Novy, 2011 ). This does not indicate how many standards or regulations are present nor how stringent they are, but this information can be used to distinguish industries according to the type of measures that exist and whether they are still a¤ected by TBTs or not.
Implicit Measures
Regional Agreements This approach consists of counting or identifying (with a dummy variable) the policy instruments that aim to harmonize standards or regulations within a region. 9 The instruments considered in the literature are usually EU-speci…c (Brenton et al., 2001 , Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006 , Baller, 2007 , Chen and Mattoo, 2008 while Mutual Recognition Agreements (on conformity assessment procedures) involve both EU and non-EU countries (Baller, 2007, Chen and Mattoo, 2008) . The count or identi…cation of instruments is carried out either at the industry level (Baller, 2007, Chen and Mattoo, 2008) or at the disaggregated level of products, in which case coverage or frequency ratios are computed at the industry level (Brenton et al., 2001, Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006) .
Surveys
The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey analyzes how the exports of 689 individual …rms in 17 developing countries to 5 developed countries in 2002 are a¤ected by foreign technical requirements. Five speci…c questions allow the construction of variables capturing the trade e¤ects of standards and technical regulations (binary variables) and of conformity assessment procedures (including the average time in days it takes for conformity assessment inspection to complete). See Maskus et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2006) . 10 Case Studies Other papers focus on the trade e¤ects of one speci…c regulation only. For instance, Otsuki et al. (2001) use the maximum a ‡atoxin levels, a toxic fungus, that are permitted in EU groundnut imports. 11 Wilson and Otsuki (2002) use the maximum residue limit (MRLs) of chlorpyrifos, a pesticide, in a¤ecting banana and plantain imports, while Wilson et al. (2003) use the MRLs of tetracycline, a widely used antibiotic, to explain beef imports. All three papers also use the di¤erence between the domestic regulation and the Codex equivalent to predict the changes in trade ‡ows if regulations were harmonized at the Codex level. 12 This allows researchers to determine the stringency of a national regulation relative to Codex in a¤ecting trade, but not the stringency of the regulation itself.
Other studies measure the di¤usion or adoption of one speci…c international standard across countries and typically investigate its e¤ect on trade. Although di¤usion does not capture the stringency of a standard, it can be expected to promote trade by stimulating the competitiveness of domestic 9 This is an implicit measure as there is no reason to expect the number of harmonization policies to be correlated with the number of standards and regulations: two countries may share the same number of harmonization policies, but one may have many standards and regulations while the other does not.
10 Other surveys include the USITC (1998) on standards in the computer hardware, software and telecommunications equipment sectors; OECD (1999) on the role of compliance costs in the telecommunications equipment, dairy products and automotive components industries; or NIST (2004) for the pharmaceuticals and automobile industries in the US.
11 Xiong and Beghin (2011) question the results by Otsuki et al. (2001) that African exports to the EU are negatively a¤ected by the maximum a ‡atoxin levels permitted.
12 The Codex Alimentarius is a collection of internationally recognized standards, guidelines and codes of practice as recommended by the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) for the agri-food industry. It o¤ers a benchmark for food standards but there is no obligation for national governments to adopt them. products by signaling their quality and safety. In the case of ISO 9000, a quality management standard for …rms, Clougherty and Grajek (2009) use the ratio between the number of ISO 9000 certi…cates in a country and its population, while Kim and Reinert (2009) rely on the proportion of …rms in each country with ISO 9000 certi…cation. Herzfeld et al. (2011) count the number of issued certi…cates for GlobalGAP and BRC Food Technical Standard in di¤erent countries.
To conclude, the reviewed literature suggests that measuring standards and technical regulations is not an easy task. Explicit measures attempt to capture the presence or the amount of standards and regulations by using dummy or count variables, frequency or coverage ratios, but their stringency remains hard to evaluate. Implicit measures su¤er from similar problems. It should be added that the possible endogeneity of standards and regulations -however measured -in explaining trade ‡ows is another concern. Firstly, standards and regulations, as well as the decision to harmonize across countries, could be the result rather than the cause of trade. Secondly, the trade weights that are required for the computation of coverage ratios are usually the same trade ‡ows that appear as a dependent variable, making coverage ratios endogenous by construction (Chen and Mattoo, 2008 , Essaji, 2008 , or Clougherty and Grajek, 2009 
The 'Indirect' Approach
We now turn to the 'indirect' approach of measuring trade costs. Indirect trade cost measures capture a wide range of trade cost elements and are therefore hardly suitable to quantify the costs related to standards and regulations only. However, they can be regressed on various trade cost proxies, including measures of standards and regulations as discussed in the previous section, and a variance decomposition can be carried out to determine the contribution of standards and regulations to the variance of the comprehensive trade cost measure.
Returning to gravity equation (1), a problem with specifying the trade cost function is its inherent arbitrariness. Although most researchers opt for a log-linear trade cost function, theory generally gives no guidance as to the appropriate functional form. 13 As a result, the estimated e¤ect of a certain trade cost element depends on the chosen ad hoc form. A second problem is that many trade cost elements are unobservable. Thus, researchers run the risk of omitting potentially important trade cost elements. A third problem is that some proxies such as distance do not vary over time, which makes it di¢cult to track changes in trade costs.
The indirect approach tries to overcome these problems by indirectly inferring implied trade costs from trade data without specifying a trade cost function. A …rst step in that direction is taken by the 'phi-ness' of trade. The idea is to isolate the trade cost variable from the micro-founded gravity equation and express it in terms of observable trade data. But solving equation (1) for    is problematic as the multilateral resistance variables are unknown. However, they can be eliminated by multiplying the gravity equation by its counterpart for trade ‡ows in the opposite direction,    , and then dividing it by the product of gravity equations for domestic trade ‡ows in each country,       . Taking the square root results in the expression for the phi-ness of trade    :
This approach was …rst adopted by Head and Ries (2001) and followed by a number of other papers (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003, Head and Mayer, 2004 ). 14 Expression (2) should be interpreted as an overall trade cost measure at the industry level that captures a comprehensive set of trade cost elements, scaled by the industry-speci…c elasticity of substitution   . It measures bilateral trade costs relative to domestic trade costs and is by construction symmetric (i.e., 
Since it is a function of observable trade data,    can generally be constructed for many countries, industries and years and is thus in principle more broadly available than many direct trade cost data. 15 For example, Head and Mayer (2004) A drawback of phi-ness is that it cannot distinguish between the trade cost variables and the elasticity of substitution   because it is based on a simple trade ratio. When dealing with aggregate data, this might not be a major concern. 16 But when the focus is on measuring trade costs at the industry level, it must be taken into account that substitution elasticities vary substantially across industries (Broda and Weinstein, 2006) . Chen and Novy (2011) therefore adopt a related trade cost measure that they denote    :
A high value of    corresponds to relatively high implied bilateral trade costs. Since a low   indicates a high degree of di¤erentiation of products and thus a large degree of heterogeneity,    is able to separate di¤erences in trade barriers from heterogeneity at the industry level. 17 Chen and Novy (2011) estimate the substitution elasticities using a methodology adapted from Feenstra (1994) It should be noted that the two expressions in (2) and (3) are not estimated but rather calibrated 14 Unlike in equation (2), phi -ness is sometimes also de…ned as ( Wei (1996) and Novy (2011) for a discussion.
16 See Jacks et al. (2008) for an application to aggregate trade data in the long run. 17 Another alternative to measuring overall trade costs would be to construct trade restrictiveness indices (Anderson and Neary, 2005) . The di¤erence to the approach underlying expressions (2) and (3) is that direct trade cost data are required to construct trade restrictiveness indices (Kee et al., 2009). from the data, not unlike the Solow residual in the growth literature or the labor wedge (Shimer, 2009) . A disadvantage is that the expressions therefore contain any measurement error that may be part of the trade ‡ow data. Thus, as a matter of caution they should be interpreted as trade cost measures, not literally as trade costs.
To conclude, the direct and the indirect approaches provide researchers with di¤erent sets of information and thus can be considered as complementary: the …rst provides measures for standards and regulations that can be used to estimate the sensitivity of trade ‡ows to standards and regulations; the second regresses implied trade costs on standards and regulations, which further allows for a decomposition of the variance of total trade costs into the contribution that is attributable to standards and regulations. Both are equally a¤ected by the problems inherent to the measurement of standards and regulations (use of count variables, frequency and coverage ratios) and by endogeneity. But in contrast to the direct approach, the indirect approach requires domestic trade data which are not always readily available, while at the same time it has an in-built control for multilateral resistance. Finally, with regard to the indirect approach,    is theoretically better suited than    to isolate the trade barrier e¤ect from the heterogeneity e¤ect, but in practice its computation can be di¢cult as it requires estimates of the substitution elasticities   .
Illustration
We now compare the direct and the indirect approaches to measuring standards. We use the data from Chen and Novy (2011) . 18 We regress the three variables on the number of private standards at the EU level taken from the World Bank's EU Standards database (Shepherd, 2006) at the HS2002 level for the agriculture, textiles and clothing industries which results in a sample of 35 NACE industries. 19 To reduce endogeneity issues standards are lagged by one period. Given that these standards are shared by EU countries, we would expect them to correlate positively with trade ‡ows and negatively with  Chen and Novy (2011) for data sources. 19 The HS2002 is more disaggregated than the NACE Rev.1 level classi…cation. We match each NACE industry with the HS code that reports the largest number of standards.
20 These variables are bilateral and domestic distances, dummies for sharing a common border, a common language, for Finland and Austria that joined the EU last in the sample and for remaining outside the Eurozone. Chen and Novy (2011) from an economic point of view, further research should investigate the reasons why controlling for heterogeneity leads to such di¤erences and what the interaction between heterogeneity and standards is.
Concluding Remarks
Standards and technical regulations are a predominant concern in today's global trade negotiations, and as claimed by Pascal Lamy, the WTO Director-General, they can even be considered as 'the real 21st century trade issues.' 21 For the purpose of empirical analysis it is therefore crucial to better measure standards and regulations, and we hope that additional and more precise measures will become available in the future. For instance, the availability of a data set similar to Perinorm but for mandatory technical regulations would be welcome. Also, although some uno¢cial concordance exists between the International Classi…cation of Standards (as used by Perinorm) and the SITC trade classi…cation (Blind, 2004) , future research would further bene…t from a better matching between standards and trade classi…cations.
As far as the indirect approach of inferring trade costs is concerned, future research needs to examine the robustness of this approach to recent theoretical innovations. For example, Fieler (2011) introduces nonhomotheticity such that rich countries produce and demand a di¤erent bundle of goods than poor countries. Nonhomotheticity would be a problem for the trade cost measures (2) and (3) if it applied di¤erentially to bilateral and domestic trade. Also, few frameworks exist for gravity with di¤erent stages of intermediate production (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2011) . In addition, Chen and Novy (2011) show that the exponent of the trade cost measure (3) is not necessarily a function of the CES substitution elasticity and could depend on technology parameters including the Fréchet parameter of the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) or the Pareto parameter of heterogeneous …rms models by Melitz (2003) or Chaney (2008) . Finally, we show that the di¤erent approaches, as well as the use of di¤erent indirect trade cost measures, can lead to contrasting predictions regarding the economic importance of standards. Understanding the reasons for such di¤erences is an additional avenue for future research. Notes: The variance decompositions are calculated according to Fields (2003) . The contribution of each explanatory variable  to the total variance of a dependent variable  is given by  =    (  )  ( ) where   is the partial regression coe¢cient of  on the explanatory variable  (holding all other explanatory variables constant). The decompositions in columns (1) to (3) correspond to regressions (1) to (3) in Table 1 . The contributions sum to 100 percent.
